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INTRODUCTION: AN OBSERVATION OF THE LEGACY
OF THE OLD CONSTITUTION
A few months ago when I was in West Berlin, I had an opportunity to talk
with a German lawyer. Our conversation went like this: He said to me, "I
understand that you are a public law professor. What field are you most
interested in?" "I have been particularly interested in the field of free
expression," I replied. "Aha, that is the field which is covered by Article 5 of
our Constitution," the German lawyer stated. "That's right," I told him.
"Whereas freedom of expression is protected by Article 5 of the Bonn
Grundgesetz, the same protection is provided by Article 21 of the Japanese
Constitution." The German lawyer commented, "That is to say, your Article
21 corresponds to our Article 5." A bit puzzled, he asked me, "But why does
such an important institution as free speech come on the stage in such a
sidetracked manner?"
At first glance, his question seems to be concerned merely with the form or
shape of the Japanese Constitution. But I do think that there is more to his
question than that. The order of constitutional provisions establishing or
guaranteeing concepts and institutions is inevitably determined by the ideas
and theories that have driven the nation to making a constitution. The order
of provisions is a reflection of the value system of the makers of the
constitution.
Now I had to try to explain to the German lawyer why freedom of
expression in Japan is constitutionally guaranteed by Article 21 rather than by
Article 5 or by even earlier articles. I did it as follows:
While the first chapter of the German Constitution deals with the guarantee of various
basic rights (Grundrechte), the first chapter of our Constitution is concerned with the
tenn5 or emperor system, which is followed by the so-called "pacifist" or "peace"
clause, Article 9. Article 9 by itself makes up the second chapter. Then, our Bill of
Rights makes an entrance in the form of the third chapter, and of course, Article 21 is
in this chapter. If those who make a constitution put at the beginning of the
constitution what they deem to be the most important, the respect and guarantee of
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fundamental rights were regarded as paramount by the founders of the German
Constitution. But in the case of the Constitution ofJapan, it was a bit different. Our
founders seem to have considered that the most important thing to do in terms of the
business of making a constitution was to let the tenni system survive, and preserve it
much as it used to be under the old constitution.
I concluded my observation by saying, "The sidetracked treatment of the
freedom of expression in our Constitution can be understood only in relation
to the survival of the tennd system or the legacy of the old constitution.",
At present, more than forty years after the promulgation of our
Constitution, it is quite an arguable question whether the tennj system still
occupies a real, pivotal position in the constitutional regime, and whether the
people still regard that system as one of the most important institutions of
government. I believe that the role that the tennd is expected to perform has
gotten considerably smaller-far smaller than expected at the time of the
promulgation of the new Constitution, and that the people in general have
become accustomed to the tenn5 playing such a small role. It should be
understood that the intention of the founders of the Constitution that the
tennd system be an integral part of the Constitution, and as such perform
politically meaningful functions, did not come to be realized. This goal for
the tennd system, which was contemplated by the elite, was largely neglected in
the process of constitutional development. However, we should keep in mind
the historical fact that the founders were almost fanatical about insisting that
preservation of the tenn5 system be the most important aim of the
Constitution.
I have been referring to the constitutional founders, among whom the
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers ("SCAP") and his staff were
included. It is a well-known fact that lawyers working for the Government
Section of SCAP took the initiative in drafting the Constitution. As a matter
of fact, the plan that a chapter dealing with the tennd system would come first
originated in the so-called "MacArthur draft" of the Constitution rather than
from any explicit demand of the Japanese Government. General MacArthur
decided that it would be better for SCAP and for Japanese society to keep that
system alive in a modified and weakened form and to utilize it to recover from
the severe war damage. Needless to say, the idea of the survival of the tennj
system concerned the Japanese Government immeasurably, since it had been
afraid that it would be forced to abolish the tennd system altogether.
1. Perhaps some of you are puzzled with the term tennd. Emperor is the English translation of
tennd and the usage of emperor prevails throughout the world. (In Germany, they refer to tenni as
kaiser. Kaiser exactly corresponds to emperor.) The use of the word emperor as connoted by tenni
originates from the official English text of the Meiji Constitution. The original title of the Meiji
Constitution is The Constitution of the Empire ofjapan. As I understand it, empire should be, as with the
Holy Roman Empire or the British Empire, more than a mere kingdom. I do not think that the
definition of empire could be applicable to the Meiji state, but its constitution proclaimed it to be an
empire. To that extent, under the Meiji Constitution, the word emperor, corresponding with the
expression empire, is perhaps appropriate, if not accurate. However, the Empire of Japan came to
naught after World War II. The Empire was gone. Thus, for example, imperial University of Tokyo
became merely University of Tokyo. Without the Empire of Japan, there is no basis for calling the
tenno "emperor."
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The constitutional modification of the tenn5 system was done in a
wholesale manner. We can say that it was almost revolutionary. Sovereign
power that had resided in the tenn5 system was now transferred to the people's
hands.2 Why, then, did the founders dare to assign that modified institution
to the first chapter in the text of the Constitution? The reason is very simple:
They just followed the way of ordering chapters found in the old
Constitution. Once they determined the survival of the tenn5 system, they felt
that it would be better to have the appearance of continuity from the Meiji
Constitution to the new Constitution. In the Meiji Constitution, the first
seventeen articles were devoted entirely to the tenn5 himself. This structure
was most appropriate to the Meiji Constitution, the aim of which was to
establish the principle of tenn-above-all. It was natural, even necessary, for
the old Constitution to begin with the tenno.
It is well known that the Meiji Constitution, promulgated in 1889-exactly
one hundred years ago-was made under the strong influence of the Prussian
Constitution of 1850. This is true to a great extent. However, so far as the
placement of the tenni clauses of the Meiji Constitution is concerned, no such
influence can be seen. In the Prussian Constitution, the first chapter (Title I)
deals with the state territory, which is followed by the second chapter (Title
II), "concerning the rights of the Prussian People." Only in the third chapter
(Title III) do provisions appear "concerning the Crown" (Articles 43-59).
This fact indicates that the Prussian Constitution was not free from the impact
of the 1848 revolution and the Frankfurt (Pauls-Kirche) Constitution of 1849.
Of course, the draftsmen of the Meiji Constitution did not like that aspect of
their Prussian model and, instead of copying that aspect of the Prussian
Constitution, they adopted the style of the constitutions of such southwestern
states as Bavaria (1818), Baden (1818), Wuirttemburg (1819), and Hessen
(1820). 3
2. However, it should be noted that the draftsmen of the Constitution tried everything, as I
shall emphasize in the text, to conceal the appearance of this characteristic of the "revolution." For
example, Article I of the 1947 Constitution reads, "The Emperor [lenno in my terminology] shall be
the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the
people with whom resides sovereign power." The construction of this Article is highly sophisticated.
This single sentence combines two different matters into one. On one hand, it discusses the status of
the tenno and gives a constitutional basis for the tennJ system. On the other hand, it explains the
location of sovereign power, or, rather, it implies the transfer of sovereign power from the tennd to
the people. At any rate, Article 1 is a delicate, complicated sentence.
3. Details of these constitutions vary. Some dealt first with the territory or general
characteristics of the states concerned and then with the Crown and the royal family; others referred
first to the crown as the Oberhaupt (head) of the state. The Belgian Constitution of 1831-in addition
to the Prussian Constitution of 1850-influenced the Meiji Constitution. However, there is a vast
difference between the Belgian and the Japanese Constitutions with respect to the style of the
provisions concerning the Crown. It is fair to say that the present Constitution, in following the style
of the placement of the tenno clause of the Meiji Constitution, is modeled on early nineteenth century
constitutions of southwestern German states rather than the 1850 Prussian Constitution.
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II
THE TENN-A MINIMAL INSTITUTION AND ITS EFFECTS
In the Introduction, I pointed out an aspect of backwardness inherent in
our Constitution. Here, I briefly trace and clarify how this aspect has revealed
itself during the past forty years or so, beginning with a discussion of lise
majesti.
Book II of the Criminal Code of 1907, 4 entitled "Crimes," indicates the
types of crimes and their corresponding penalties. In 1947, the first Chapter
of Book II dealing with special crimes committed against the tenni and the
Royal Family was abolished. 5 High treason against the tennJ, lese majesti, was
done away with at that time. Before and during the war, Article 74, providing
for lese majesti, had been heavily utilized as a powerful weapon against political
dissidents.
Immediately following the surrender, a disastrous situation prevailed
throughout the country. Food was extremely scarce. Public demonstrations
against government policies were organized in various cities. One day in the
spring of 1946, a protest demanding food provisions was held at the Palace
Plaza in Tokyo. One participant carried a placard stating: "Imperial edict of
Hirohito: The national polity is maintained; we, the Sovereign, are eating our
fill; ye, our subjects, be starved and die! The Imperial Signature and Seal.""3
The Government deemed that the placard constituted lese majesti and
indicted the man. On November 2 of the same year, the Tokyo District Court
found him guilty, but on the basis of the regular defamation law7 rather than
of lese majesti. Interestingly, the very next morning, a decree of general
amnesty8 was issued, which immediately pardoned anyone who had been
found guilty of lMse majesti. The defendant, however, appealed the case to the
Tokyo High Court seeking a declaration that he was not guilty. In June 1947,
the high court dismissed the appeal on the basis of the amnesty decree,
without hearing the merits of the case. The case went to the Supreme Court,
which in May 1948 affirmed the high court's decision, again, without hearing
the merits of the case.9
The new Constitution, which had not even been promulgated at the time
of the trial, came into effect in May 1947, and, therefore, was applicable to the
case in the second and final instances. If the new Constitution were applicable
to this case, it was arguably the case that the provision of lese majest-a very
special, criminal defamation clause-was in contravention of Article 14 of the
Constitution, which required equal protection of the law. In fact, the
4. KEIH6 (PENAL CODE), Law No. 45, 1907.
5. Law No. 124, 1947.
6. Translated into English and quoted in SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED POWERS,
POLITICAL REORIENTATION OFJAPAN, SEPTEMBER 1945 TO SEPTEMBER 1948, at 240 (1949).
7. PENAL CODE arts. 230, 230(2); see infra note 79.
8. Imperial Order No. 511, 1946.
9. 2 Keishu 529 (Sup. Ct., G.B., May 26, 1948). Decisions of the Tokyo District Court and the
Tokyo High Court are printed in 2 Keish6i at 603.
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defendant asked the courts to consider the question of constitutionality on
this point. However, as we have seen already, neither the high court nor the
Supreme Court accepted the defendant's invitation, and, instead, both
dismissed the case on the basis of the amnesty decree. The courts preferred
to avoid a constitutional issue.
While the placard case was pending before the high court, SCAP tried to
persuade the Cabinet to prepare a draft deleting entirely the first Chapter of
Book II of the Criminal Code.' 0 General MacArthur insisted that since the
tennJ had declared himself a natural human being rather than a divine being,
special legal treatment of the tenn5 and the royal family should remain only as
minimally necessary, and that, for this reason, the first Chapter of Book II
should be abolished. Prime Minister Yoshida firmly opposed General
MacArthur, maintaining that any harm to the tennd would be against the
interest of the state. Since the tenn5 was regarded as the central figure of the
Japanese people's moral respect, he and the royal family should be entitled to
the special protections extended by the first Chapter of Book II. SCAP was, of
course, powerful enough to insist upon its demand for the deletion of the first
Chapter of Book II." I
One can imagine how reluctant the Japanese Government, including the
judicial court, was in liberating the people from the traditional tennd regime.
However, once the new Constitution replaced the old one, the Government
lost legal support for its conservative position and was forced to accept the
change. Almost all prewar, special laws concerning the tennd were abolished.
Instead, only a few laws were newly enacted to implement certain
constitutional provisions. ' 2
The very Constitution which has bequeathed to the nation the tenn5
system-a somewhat anachronistic institution, I venture to say-also declares
in its Preamble a lofty principle of democracy reminding one of President
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address.' 3 It has been established for forty years that
10. Chapter 1 of Book II, entitled "Crimes Against the Imperial House," consisted of four
articles. Article 73 was a capital punishment clause against anyone who had inflicted or had been
about to inflict physical harm upon the emperor, the empress dowager, the empress consort, the
prince imperial, or the eldest grandson of the emperor in the direct line. Article 74 imposed a
criminal sanction on anyone who had committed an act of an insulting and disrespectful nature
against any person listed above or against their holy settlements. Articles 75 and 76 were similar
provisions protecting other members of the Imperial House.
11. See Shiro Haga, Nihon Kanri no Kiko to Seisaku, in YUHIKAKU 93-94 (1951). As for lese maestiin
Japan, see generally L. BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN JAPAN 48, 53, 77-80 (1984).
12. Major legislation in this field is as follows: the Imperial House Law, Law No. 3, 1947; the
Law Concerning Fiscal Matters of the Imperial House, Law No. 4, 1947; the Law Concerning Ad Hoc
Deputations of Royal Performances, Law No. 83, 1964; and the Law of the National Calendar, Law
No. 43, 1979.
13. The Preamble of the Constitution ofJapan declares:
We, the Japanese people ... do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and
do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the
authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the
representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a
universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded.
1947 CONST. preamble.
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this principle of democracy is one of the three constitutional principles-the
other two are the principle of world peace, or pacifism, and the principle of
the protection of fundamental human rights.
The tennd system, which was the most controversial issue at the time of the
enactment of the new Constitution, remains alive as only a minor institution
in the constitutional constellation. It is now nothing more than an accessory
to democracy. 14
III
AMERICAN INFLUENCE UPON THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN
While Chapter 1 deals with the tennJ, Chapter 2 is entitled "Renunciation
of War." The question of who took the initiative in inserting this Chapter
(which consists of a single clause, Article 9) in the text of the Constitution has
provoked a great deal of discussion. But, for my present purpose, it suffices
to say that there exists no American constitutional influence upon either
Chapter 1 or Chapter 2.
Apart from these examples and several other instances, the influence of
American constitutionalism is evident and decisive. In the following
paragraphs in this section and in section IV, I would like to provide an
overview by showing three aspects of significant American influence on the
1947 Constitution: the ideas of democracy, individual rights, and judicial
review.
A. Idea of Democracy
The single most important contribution of the United States Constitution
to that of Japan was the concept of democracy. The predominant
characteristic of the Meiji Constitution was its so-called Schein-
Konstitutionalismus, or pseudo-constitutionalism. The political system of
prewar Japan was a modernized version of an absolute monarchy, and the
concept of democracy was regarded as unadaptable to Japan. This is why it
was constitutionally impossible, or would at least have been extremely
difficult, in the prewar years to democratize the political system ofJapan in the
sense of "government by the people's consent," even though a bicameral
parliamentary system, more or less similar to the Westminster type, had been
adopted and practiced for the sake of appearance.
In marked contrast, the present Constitution clearly declares that
sovereignty resides in the people. Thus, the idea of democracy should and
can be applied and can penetrate without reservation throughout all the
affairs of government.
14. I believe that being merely an "accessory" is not only recognized in a normative sense but
also in the general perception of the people. Of course, many people think the tenn should be even
more of an accessory. Furthermore, there always remains a question as to what type of accessory is
desirable, appropriate, or necessary. Recently, during the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989,
we witnessed an outburst of divided discussions from the time of Hirohito's death to Akihito's
assumption of office.
[Vol. 53: No. I
FORTY YEARS OF THE CONSTITUTION
With respect to the political scheme, however, the Constitution prefers a
British-style, parliamentary-cabinet system; it does not adopt the presidential
system and the strict separation of powers of the American model. The
Constitution provides for a bicameral system, stating in Article 43 that "[t]he
Diet shall consist of two Houses, namely the House of Representatives and
the House of Councillors." In its bicameral appearance, the Diet is the same
as the British Parliament. However, while members of the British House of
Lords are not elected by the people, but are appointed by the Crown instead,
the Japanese House of Councillors, as well as its House of Representatives,
"shall consist of elected members, representative of all the people."' 15
Interestingly, the so-called MacArthur Draft intended to introduce
unicameralism.' 6 SCAP's position seemed both simple and persuasive: The
British type of bicameralism-which served as the model of the Diet system of
the Meiji Constitution-is not wholly democratic. Since Japan has a unitarian
type of government, there would not be any basis for adopting the American
type of bicameralism unique to its federal system. Therefore, bicameralism
would be redundant.
However, the Japanese Government did not like the idea of
unicameralism. Enumerating certain merits of bicameralism, the Government
requested that SCAP change its position. SCAP accepted this request on the
condition that the members of each House be elected by the people and
represent all the people. As a result, Article 43 of the present Constitution
was adopted.' 7 However, this provision created a new problem: how to
distinguish the House of Councillors from the House of Representatives.
While the Japanese founders were sticking to the ideas of bicameralism
and a House of Councillors in addition to a House of Representatives, one
possible method of distinguishing the two was contemplated: introducing a
house of vocational representation similar to the system of the two Councils
of Labor and of Management in the 1919 Weimar Constitution.' 8 Moreover,
the wording of Article 43, clause 1, is a bit ambiguous. It raises a question
whether that clause permits some sort of "indirect election" to select
members of the House of Councillors. Immediately after the Constitution
became effective, there were some who argued that "indirect election" was
permissible and desirable in terms of the House of Councillors' membership.
But there has been no attempt to replace the existing direct popular-vote
system with such an indirect election.
If the election system is the same between the two houses, what other
distinctions should exist between them? The Constitution has several
15. 1947 CONST. art. 43.
16. Article XLI of the Draft states that "[t]he Diet shall consist of one House of elected
representatives with a membership of not less than 300 nor more than 500." Takayanagi, Otomo &
Tanaka, Nihonkoku Kempd Seitei no Katei, in I YOHIKAKU 282 (1972). The approval of the nobility, a
prerequisite for the prewar House of Peers, MEUI CONST. art. 34, should no longer exist under the
new Constitution. 1947 CONST. art. 14(2).
17. Takayanagi, Otomo & Tanaka, supra note 16, at 197-99 (vol. 2).
18. Der Arbeiterrat and der Iirtschaftsrat, art. 165 of the Weimar Constitution of August 11, 1919.
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provisions that make the House of Representatives superior to the House of
Councillors in such political matters as legislation,' 9 the enactment of
treaties,20 and the appointment of the Prime Minister.2 ' Besides these
provisions, the Constitution does not say much about the differences between
the powers, functions, or roles of the two Houses. Thus, this problem of
determining any differences is left to legislative solution. If the House of
Representatives is treated as a fixed star, the question can be phrased in
relation to the House of Councillors. For example, how is that House
distinctive? How do we differentiate it from the House of Representatives?
What role is it expected to play in parliamentary deliberation? This is the
"House of Councillors Question."
This problem developed as a result of the Japanese Government's refusal
of the MacArthur draft. I sometimes wonder what would have happened in
the postwar political process if Japan had introduced unicameralism. 22
B. Protection of Individual Rights
The influence of the United States Constitution has been decisive in the
field of protecting individual rights. The Constitution of Japan has adopted
various legal concepts based on the unique American concept of
individualism, including the notions of freedom and equality, and provides a
comparatively detailed list of "fundamental human rights." The very term
"human rights" calls to mind the American idea of civil liberties with a natural
law flavor. The prewar Constitution was based on the idea of legal positivism,
originating from the late 19th-century German doctrine of state law and,
therefore, gave no room for any concept deriving from the idea of natural law
or higher law. Thus, the respect for individual rights contained in the postwar
Constitution, along with the expansion of individualism in social and political
development, are the most important features differentiating postwar and
prewar Japanese society.
1. Enumeration of "Fundamental Human Rights. " The Bill of Rights in the
Constitution of Japan is more extensive than that of the American
Constitution. First, the Constitution of Japan enumerates socioeconomic
rights because of the influence of the Weimar Constitution and the experience
of the American New Dealers. Second, the Constitution of Japan contains
detailed safeguards in its provisions concerning the criminal justice process.
In adopting the American system of criminal justice, which was unfamiliar to
the Japanese, it was considered necessary to write detailed provisions. Third,
19. 1947 CONST. art. 59(2).
20. Id. art. 60(2).
21. Id. art. 67(2).
22. Until recently, because both houses had been controlled by the same party-the party in
power, the Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP")-the difference in political posture between the two
houses was rather small. In July 1989, however, at the latest regular election of members of the
House of Councillors, the LDP lost its majority of seats for the first time in its forty-year history. The
new stage for the development of the bicameral system may come in the future.
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freedoms are enumerated differently. Unlike the first amendment of the
United States Constitution, which encompasses comprehensively diverse
aspects of freedom, the Constitution of Japan provides for the protection of
each freedom in separate articles: freedom of thought, 23 freedom of religion
(which stipulates the constitutional guarantee of the separation of state and
religion), 24 freedom of speech and of the press, 25 freedom of gathering and
association, 26 and academic freedom. 27
Socioeconomic rights, as typified by "the right to maintain the minimum
standards of wholesome and cultured living," and more classic civil liberties,
such as freedom of speech and of the press, are specified equally as
"fundamental human rights." The Japanese public also tends to think that
these rights are fundamental rights and should therefore be given the same
level of protection. However, since we cannot and should not expect all the
rights enumerated in the Constitution to be equally protected, some kind of
differentiation among the various rights is necessary. Issues remain, however,
as to what kind of theory and what sort of standard should be applied in
determining the limits ofjudicial review, while giving deference to legislative
discretion.
The "double standard" of scrutiny, which calls for strict scrutiny of alleged
infringements of certain rights and more relaxed scrutiny of others, and which
originated in Justice Stone's footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products
Company,28 is widely, and, I must also add, roughly, accepted, not only by
academics but also by the Japanese Supreme Court.2 However, there are
more than a few who subscribe to the theory that, under the 1947
Constitution, which enumerates the socioeconomic rights as fundamental
human rights, this standard should never be applied.
2. Protection of Citizens' Rights
a. Political freedom and other first amendment rights. It is generally accepted
in Japan that the most important of our various "fundamental rights" are what
Americans call "civil liberties." The role of the "consequentialist" reasoning
is significant in emphasizing the nature of liberties as essential to democracy
and the protection of liberties as a basic constitutional principle necessary for
the democratic process. As a result, freedom of expression of political
opinion by Japanese mass media is almost at the level of that of the Western
democracies. There has been practically no legal limitation of the freedom of
23. 1947 CONST. art. 19.
24. Id. art. 20.
25. Id. art. 21.
26. Id.
27. Id. art. 23.
28. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
29. The Supreme Court, in a Grand Bench decision, showed an affirmative position for adopting
the "double standard" ofjudicial review akin to the U.S. practice. 26 Keishfi 586 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,
Nov. 22, 1972).
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political opinion, except for the Subversive Activities Control Law of 1952.30
However, there have been just a few cases in which the application of this law
became an issue. At the time this law was enacted, the Japan Communist
Party ("JCP") or its front organizations, were its political targets, but no
organization has ever been designated officially as a "subversive activities
organization." No legal restriction has been imposed upon any political
organization except for the JCP, which was outlawed by the Occupation
powers for a short period. Streitbare Demokratie, or militant democracy, which
justifies a deprivation of the political freedom of groups like the Communists
under the name of "democracy," is not widely accepted among the Japanese
people.
The status of the freedom of expression in Japan may be explained by the
statement that "Japan is politically free, but socially not free." In the formal
and legal political processes, political freedom is guaranteed to a remarkable
extent. However, in the social processes that exist inside private corporations
and organizations, freedom of expression has both heteronomous and
autonomous restrictions that are based on a uniquely East Asiatic, or
Japanese, sense of submission related to the Confucian concept of hierarchy.
Still, the Japanese enjoy freedom of expression and keep a delicate balance
between these formal and informal relations.
What kind of guarantee is given to the freedom of expression when it
concerns moral judgments such as pornography? Generally speaking, an
expression that is more remote from the political processes, and as a result
closer to the "software" component of society, is more strictly regulated in
Japan than in the West. The expressed justification for this tendency has a
somewhat paternalistic character. 31 In a time of active and extensive
international exchange as we have today, such literature can easily be brought
into Japan from abroad. Customs censorship is claimed to be an effective
water's-edge operation to prevent the introduction of foreign immorality.
30. Law No. 240, 1952. This law was modelled after the United States Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781 et seq. (1950). See infra note 89. As for the restraint on
Communist movements, SCAP requested the Japanese Government to adopt a law regulating anti-
SCAP or anti-Government organizations. The Government followed SCAP's directive by enacting a
Cabinet Order entitled "Order of Regulations on Organizations" (Cabinet Order No. 64, 1949)
based on the United States Smith Act of 1940, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1988). This order prevailed during
the Occupation. But with the termination of Occupation rule in April 1952, this law became
ineffective because of the anomaly of its enactment procedures. In order to control civil liberties in a
constitutional way, the Government should rely upon a law enacted by the Diet rather than by the
Cabinet. At the time of ending the Occupation, SCAP and the Government were prepared for the
enactment of a new law covering control of Communists: The result was the 1952 Subversive
Activities Control Law. The new law came in force in July 1952, a few months after the end of the
Occupation.
31. The leading case on obscenity control is the Supreme Court decision of 1957. The Court
affirmed the constitutionality of government restraint on D.H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover,
Koyama v. Japan, II Keishu 997 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Mar. 13, 1957). Since then, the courts have made
numerous decisions on obscenity issues. The general tendency of courts is to try to elaborate on the
standard of obscenity, without, however, being bothered with arguments about the constitutional
justification of government control of obscenity. As a result, a somewhat paternalistic and
authoritarian reasoning enunciated by the Court's holding in 1957 is still regarded as controlling.
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When the constitutionality of customs censorship was challenged, the
question was raised whether there was a violation of an explicit provision in
the Constitution, which says "No censorship shall be maintained." 32 The
Supreme Court gave less than convincing reasoning in ruling that "customs
censorship" does not constitute "censorship." 33
b. "Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. " Article 13 of the Constitution
of Japan, which states that "all of the people shall be respected as
individuals," makes individualism a constitutional principle and a basic
philosophy. This change is particularly significant in modern Japan. In
prewar days, except in hypothetical terms, individualism was never a socially
recognized ideology. The individual-completely contrary to Kant's
categorical imperative-had been regarded as the ruler's tool. Article 13 goes
on to provide that "individuals' right to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare,
be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental
affairs." The right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness derives from
the text of the Declaration of Independence of the United States.
It was only in the 1960s that the concept of privacy came to be commonly
referred to in Japanese society. Since there is no Japanese equivalent for this
word, the English word was adopted with Japanese pronunciation. The
economic growth since the late 1960s has enabled the Japanese to enjoy a
certain amount of time for their personal lives. This change brought respect
for privacy and autonomy in personal matters. The Supreme Court, in 1969,
declared that Article 13 covers "freedom concerning private life." 34 The
significant development of an information-oriented society in Japan has made
clear the need to protect individuals' privacy. However, legal recourse for the
protection of privacy is far behind that of the West,3 5 even though there
seems to be no fundamental difference in the two areas' perceptions of the
need for these protections.
Under the pressure of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development and other international organizations, the Japanese
Government recently came to realize the desirability of protecting
information about private matters and providing security for other data. They
presented to the Diet a Cabinet bill concerning the protection of private
information in an automated data system handled by administrative agencies.
The bill passed the Diet in the end of 1988 and became effective in October
1989.36 Thus, finally Japan has achieved what is, more or less, an institutional
32. 1947 CONST. art. 21(2).
33. Matsui v. Chief, Hakodate Customs Office, 38 Minshfi 1308 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 12, 1984)
(a case on the constitutionality of the Customs Bureau censorship scheme).
34. Hasegawa v. Japan, 23 Keish6i 1624 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 24, 1969).
35. Cf A. WESTIN, GOVERNMENT LOOKS AT PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN COMPUTER SYSTEM 4 (1973)
(summary of a Conference held at the National Bureau of Standards, Gaithersburg, Md., Nov. 19-20,
1973).
36. Law No. 95, 1988.
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protection scheme similar to that of the United States Privacy Act of 1974.37
It still remains to be seen whether this scheme will work very well.
c. Due process in criminal proceedings. In the field of criminal procedure,
the Constitution of Japan, by providing fairly detailed provisions in several
clauses, transplanted to Japan the American system of criminal justice, a
system drastically different from the system then existing in Japan. Since the
adversarial system had been utterly unknown in prewar Japan, in spite of the
adoption of a completely new Constitution, the transplantation did not go
smoothly at the working level.
One point that clearly distinguishes the Japanese Constitution from the
United States Constitution is that the Japanese Constitution does not
guarantee the right to trial by jury. The constitutional silence on this matter,
and how this should be interpreted, is an interesting issue.
For a short period before and during the war (1928-1943), a type of strictly
limited jury system was adopted. 38 There is room for debate about the
effectiveness and appropriateness of this system. In any case, the
constitutional silence does not imply that trial by jury is prohibited, and there
are advocates among lawyers who support its revival. Although many of those
who support trial by jury believe that it is a system that prevents the courts
from making mistakes, the validity of this argument remains questionable. A
more convincing point raised by those in favor of trial by jury seems to be the
democratic idea of the need to adopt a system that allows popular
participation in criminal proceedings.
d. Equality under the law. An American lawyer once pointed out that, as
compared to the United States, Japan has very few cases concerning Article
14, which guarantees equality under the law.3 9 In addition, none of these
cases deals with the substance of the equal protection quarantees. There are
fewer precedents concerning equal protection doctrine in Japan than in the
United States. However, my personal opinion is that many of the issues dealt
with by the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution are
treated here in Japan under Article 14 as issues concerning socioeconomic
rights.
37. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988).
38. A 1928 Diet enactment introduced a jury system, Law No. 50, 1928. It was, however,
suspended in 1943, Law No. 88, 1943. Since then, no action has been taken.
39. Article 14 provides:
All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political,
economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.
Peers and peerage shall not be recognized.
No privilege shall accompany any award of honor, decoration or any distinction, nor shall
any such award be valid beyond the lifetime of the individual who now holds or hereafter
may receive it.
1947 CONST. art. 14.
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Generally speaking, Japanese are equality-minded rather than liberty-
minded,40 and the Japanese concern for equality is socioeconomic and
substantive in nature. This observation does not mean that there is no issue
of inequality in Japan. However, because the existing patterns of
discrimination are not necessarily linked to legal sanctions, the problems are
more difficult to solve.
The social characteristic of Japan, described earlier with the expression,
"politically free, but socially not free," is also evident in patterns of
discrimination. Discrimination against women and minorities-such as the
people of a class called "Burakumin"'41-remains deeply built into society,
although it may not be reflected in the legal system. The mechanism of giving
grants-in-aid to communities of people coming from the Burakumin class may
be called a modified version of American affirmative action programs. 42
Discrimination against women in labor relations is obvious; however, no
affirmative action program has been adopted to remedy this situation. 43
The myth of the "homogeneous" Japanese prevails inJapan. Even former
Prime Minister Nakasone, during his tenure of office, was proud of and
boasted about "Japan's homogeneity."-44 Through foreigners' eyes, this myth
must appear xenophobic. Korean, Chinese, and Taiwanese residents in
Japan, many of them born in Japan and having an appearance, behavior, and
way of life almost indistinguishable from those of theJapanese, must find this
myth particularly annoying. These "foreigners," like other foreigners, are
also subject to various unwelcome special regulations. Whether or not such
legal discrimination constitutes a violation of the Constitution is still a subject
of debate.4 5
40. See KatoJiyu to Matawa Byodo (Liberty and/or Equality), SEKAI, Jan. 1985.
41. Burakumin are descendants of persons classified as nonhuman, or not belonging to human
society, during the Tokugawa period (approximately 1600 to 1868). Although all legal classifications
of Burakumin were eliminated shortly after the Meiji restoration, social discrimination continues.
42. Law Concerning Special Financial Assistance for the Improvement of Designated Areas, Law
No. 22, 1987.
43. In accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (adopted in 1977, effective 1985), an amendment law equalizing the
working conditions of women was enacted. Law No. 45, 1985. The new law is, however, nothing
more than a mere guidance program. It imposes upon employers only moral obligations of
advancing women's positions and provides no legal sanctions for noncompliance.
44. On September 22, 1986, Prime Minister Nakasone spoke at a conference of the LDP on his
favorite theory of the "racial singleness" of Japanese society. He maintained that the "intellectual
level" of the Japanese people was higher than that of multiracial Americans. Criticisms on his
statement came first from abroad rather than from within.
45. The most notorious shortcoming in Japan's human rights record is its treatment of aliens,
particularly Koreans. See, e.g.,Japan's Denationalization of the Korean Minority, 29 I.CJ. REV. 28 (1982);
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw GROUP, LEGAL TREATMENT OF KOREANS IN JAPAN
(1986) (prepared by Yuji Iwasawa).
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IV
THE ADoP'TION OF FOREIGN LAW: DUE PROCESS
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
To understand the adoption of foreign law, we should consider how the
concepts of due process and judicial review, transplanted to Japanese soil,
have grown for forty years-what kind of branches and leaves have developed,
how these features differ from the model, and why they differ. It is difficult
work, indeed.
A. The Concept of Due Process
The process by which foreign law was incorporated into the Japanese
Constitution can also be seen through the Constitution's treatment of the
concept of due process of law. It is almost certain that the draftsmen of SCAP
deliberately avoided using the term "due process of law" in the text of the
Japanese Constitution. There is no due process clause identical to that which
Americans have in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to their Constitution.
Article 31 of theJapanese Constitution is similar to the due process clause. It
says: "No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other
criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by
law." It was generally maintained in the early days of the Constitution that,
however similar Article 13 might appear to be to its American cousin, it did
not constitute a due process clause. The reasons were that, first, unlike the
American model, Article 31 states, "No person shall be deprived of life or
liberty" without mentioning "property." And, second, instead of the
American phraseology, "without due process of law," Article 31 used the
wording, "except according to procedure established by law." A majority of
SCAP legal officers were New Dealers, and it is reasonable to assume that they
hated the "substantive due process" analysis that invalidated much early New
Deal legislation. Perhaps it is true that these Americans did not desire to
introduce into postwar Japan the due process jurisprudence that had existed
in the 1930s in the United States.
In connection with this topic, the Indian experience is illuminating.
Article 22 of the Indian Constitution of 1949 provides: "No citizen shall be
deprived of his personal liberty except according to procedure established by
law." This Article was, as an Indian professor proves, written under the
influence of Article 31 of the Japanese Constitution. 46 It is reported that
during the framing of the Indian Constitution, B.N. Rau, who was the
constitutional advisor to the Constituent Assembly, visited North America for
discussions with eminent persons in the field of constitutional law and was
advised by Justice Felix Frankfurter not to include the due process clause in
the Indian Constitution. Justice Frankfurter's position was "that the power of
review implied in the 'due process' clause was not only undemocratic but also
46. Basu, Limitations of Fundamental Rights, 10 KENP5 CHOSAKAI SHIRYO 71 (1969) (with special
reference to the Constitutions of the United States, India, and Japan).
[Vol. 53: No. I
FORTY YEARS OF THE CONSTITUTION
threw an unfair burden on the judiciary. ' ' 4 7 It seems that in order to get rid of
the possibility of a judicial activist interpretation, the constitutional founders
in both Japan and India took care not to introduce a due process clause.
The scope of the American concept of due process of law is wide, and it
has various meanings. "Substantive due process" is not the only meaning of
the due process clause. Above all, it connotes procedural safeguards in
criminal proceedings. As discussed above, this aspect of due process is
reasonably well covered by the Constitution of Japan in Articles 32 to 39.
Thus, in contrast to the American concept, due process was institutionalized
in the Constitution ofJapan as a narrower concept, especially concerned with
criminal justice.
The American concept of due process of law implies procedural
safeguards not only in criminal proceedings, but also in every phase of the
governmental process, including administrative proceedings. The Japanese,
who had been influenced by German law, were utterly unfamiliar with the
concept of procedural due process. Articles 32 to 39 enable the Japanese to
enjoy due process protection within the field of criminal proceedings. But
what about procedural due process in other areas of state power?
Twenty years ago-coincidentally twenty years after the promulgation of
the Constitution of Japan-Professor Walter Gellhorn of Columbia Law
School was asked at a session of the Cabinet Committee of Investigation of
the Constitution to give his comments on the Constitution of Japan. He
stated, "I have no hesitancy in expressing the belief that Japan has not yet
sufficiently concerned itself with procedures." He continued, "I believe this
[change regarding due process] to be one of the areas that most urgently
deserves continuing study and reflection, lest the high aspirations of the
Constitution be set at naught by crude methods of law administration.- 48 He
criticized the lack of respect for procedural safeguards in general, but his
bitter comment was specifically concerned with the field of administrative
process. There was no serious attempt to provide a citizen with procedural
protections against an administrative agency. Such terms as the "right to
notice" and the "right to have an opportunity for a hearing" were scarcely
known to the Japanese at that time.
Many factors contribute to such an underdeveloped situation regarding
procedural protection. The most important of all was the traditional lack of
awareness on the part of the Japanese regarding procedural due process. If
an explicit due process clause had been adopted, the new Constitution might
have changed the way of thinking in this respect. But in actuality, the due
process clause was deliberately excluded from the new Constitution. Though
some institutions for due process were adopted in the area of criminal justice,
their adoption was done in such a localized way that it was not enough to
47. B. SHIVA RAO, THE FRAMING OF INDIA'S CONSTITUTION: A STUDY 235 (1968), quoted in Lester,
The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 544 (1988).
48. Gellhorn, Comment on the Constitution of Japan, 50 KENP6 CHOSAKAI SHIRYO 18 (1969).
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create a new sense of procedural due process with broader implications that
might have been similar to American ideas.
Professor Gellhorn's observation was totally correct then, and still is so
today to a great extent. However, a sign of an emerging Japanese sense of
procedural due process was gradually shown in court decisions in the early
1960s. In 1962 the Supreme Court announced for the first time that in some
situations Articles 29 and 31 of the Constitution required that "notice and
opportunity of explanation and defense" be given to a person whose rights
have been invaded. 49 In 1963 the Tokyo District Court held for the first time
that the court would reverse an administrative agency's denial of a license to
become a taxi driver because the applicant had not been given notice and the
opportunity for a hearing. 50 A few months later, the same Tokyo District
Court handed down a similar decision in the case of a bus route license. 5'
These two cases finally reached the Supreme Court, and in both cases the
Court substantially affirmed the district court's position that the applicants
should have been provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard. 52
Interestingly, however, the Court held so as a matter of statutory
interpretation, without mentioning constitutional law at all. Awareness
regarding procedural due process has increased considerably, especially since
the 1970s when the demand for participatory democracy increased.
As mentioned above, the adoption of "due process of law" in an explicit
way was deliberately avoided by the draftsmen of the present Constitution.
And, partly because of this lack of textual support, the development of the
concept of "due process of law" was retarded and remained only in a narrow
field. However, as modern constitutionalism and constitutional institutions,
including the system of judicial review, have become more prevalent, the
value of "due process of law" has been gradually recognized; we now can say
that it has become part of our Constitution-without an explicit clause to
guarantee that concept.
B. The Concept of Judicial Review
1. Arguments About Article 81. Article 81 of the Constitution of Japan
provides that "[t]he Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to
determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act."
Against the general background of American influence in the drafting and
subsequent deliberations attending the enactment of the Japanese
Constitution, it was reasonable to assume that Article 81 was intended to
introduce the American system of judicial review developed from Marbury v.
49. The case concerned the confiscation of third-party property related to smuggling. 16
Keish6i 1593 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 28, 1962).
50. 14 Gy6sh5i 1666 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Sept. 18, 1963), aff'd, 25 Minsh6 1037 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B.,
Oct. 28, 1971).
51. 14 Gy6shfi 2255 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Dec. 25, 1963), aff'd, 29 Minshfi 662 (Sup. Ct., 2d P.B.,
May 29, 1975).
52. 25 Minsh6i 1037; 29 Minshfi 662.
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Madison.53  This assumption finally prevailed, but not without some
opposition. Some legal scholars took the position that Article 81 should be
interpreted as conferring upon the Supreme Court a special power so that it
would become a constitutional court as well as the highest court of appeal. 54
Standing on the traditional legal viewpoint, they invoked Article 81. Under
the prewar system, judicial review was utterly unthinkable; the Japanese could
go only so far in accepting an institution such as a constitutional court or a
constitutional review board of the European type. 55 In 1948, however, in
judging a criminal case, the Supreme Court declared: "Article 81 of our
Constitution should be characterized as an explicit provision adopting the
type of judicial review which has been established in the [United States] by
way of the mere interpretation of the Constitution. ' ' 56 That statement was
obiter dictum. The elaboration of this point remained for another occasion.
In October 1952, the Court elaborated on this issue in a case in which the
chairman of the left-wing section of the Socialist Party was the plaintiff.5 7 The
chairman filed suit against the state directly with the Supreme Court without
first going through the screening of the lower courts. In his suit, the chairman
asked the Court to declare that an ordinance establishing the Police Force
Reserve, which was enacted only by the Cabinet, was in violation of Article 9,
the pacifist clause, and was therefore invalid. The Supreme Court declined to
review the merits of his arguments and instead held that litigation like this
could not be sustained because there were only abstract arguments and no
concrete case. The plaintiff had no standing to file an action. It is generally
understood that, in so holding, the Supreme Court considered whether there
existed a "case or controversy," which is required by the United States
Constitution as a prerequisite to constitutional litigation. 58
2. Transformation of Judicial Power. The purpose of the introduction of
judicial review by Article 81 was to revolutionize the traditional concept of the
judiciary. This change was not clearly recognized for a period after the
Constitution's enactment, and, most likely, the revolutionary process remains
unfinished even today.
53. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
54. See, e.g., Sasaki, Saikosaibunsho no Kenpi Saibansho, 11 K6H6 ZASSHI 1 (1950).
55. As early as 1914, one academic lawyer, Professor Sasaki of Kyoto University, influenced by
the German and Australian idea of constitutional court (Verfassungsgerichtshof), argued that there
was no constitutional obstacle to establishing such a body. Sasaki, Kenpo Saibansho no Gi, in RiKKEN
HIRRIKEN, KOBUNDO 330 (1917).
56. Komatsu v. Japan, 2 Keish5 801, 806 (Sup. Ct., G.B., July 8, 1948).
57. 6 MinshfO 783 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 8, 1952).
58. Another question concerning the interpretation of Article 81 was whether the lower courts
were also entitled to review the constitutionality of legislation. If put to an American, an affirmative
answer would come back almost automatically. By contrast, through Western European eyes, the
text of Article 81 looks as if only the Supreme Court was granted special power to review the
constitutionality of state actions. In 1950, the Court decided in favor of the lower courts. This is
another indication of the adoption of the American model. Yanagi v. Japan, 4 Keish6 73 (Sup. Ct.,
G.B., Feb. 1, 1950).
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According to the prewar concept of judicial power, based on German
constitutional doctrine, judicial courts were used only for solving legal
disputes among citizens and for dealing with criminal sanctions. All other
litigation was outside the jurisdiction of judicial courts. Thus, for example,
administrative law litigation could be handled only by a special tribunal within
the administrative branch. 59 It would seem that this concept of the judiciary
was closely related to the peculiarly German idea of the dualism of state and
society. Judicial courts should be concerned with matters within society, and
the government (or the crown) should be responsible for state affairs
involving matters of the relationship between the state and society.
Article 81 of the new Constitution provides judicial courts with the power
to review an act's constitutionality, a concept that had been absolutely foreign
to the traditional concept of the judiciary. Furthermore, it is almost an
established interpretation that under Article 76, clauses 1 and 2, no
administrative court, as existed in prewarJapan, shall be maintained. Against
the backdrop of these two constitutional provisions and of the general
character of the whole Constitution, it seemed rather natural to assume that
the framers were creating a brand-new concept of judicial power. But the
process of its creation has not proven to be an easy one.
In 1953, the Japan Association of Public Law published issue number 8 of
Kdhd Kenkyu. 60 The journal is divided into three parts, one of which is
entitled, [The] Relationship Between the Administrative Power and the Judicial Power.
The leading article is entitled Prerogatives of Administrative Authorities Against
Judicial Review and was written by Professor Joji Tagami of Hitotsubashi
University. Professor Tagami emphasized the limitations on judicial power in
relation to administrative activities. He seemed particularly interested in
narrowing judicial judgments based on the merit of administrative decisions
by stressing the discretionary power of administrative agencies. He also
argued that both declaratory judgments and mandamus writs were generally
impermissible against administrative authorities.
An article by Professor Yoshimoto Yanase appears in the same journal
section.6 1 Professor Yanase firmly adhered to the traditional, narrow concept
of judicial power in spite of the constitutional change. 62 Professor Yanase
maintained that the jurisdiction of the judiciary covered only civil and criminal
litigation and that, therefore, disputes concerning administrative law
belonged intrinsically to an area outside (fremdes gebiet) of the judicial
power. Further, he insisted that there was an essential limit on judicial
intervention in the field of administrative law. The reader will notice in the
articles appearing in Kjh5 Kenkyu the frequent repetition of terms such as
59. See MEIJI CONST. art. 61.
60. Tagami, Prerogatives of Administrative Authorities against Judicial Review, 8 K616 KENKYU 100-11
(1953).
61. Yanase, [The] Relationship Between the Administrative Power and the Judicial Power, 8 K616 KENKYU
123-29 (1953).
62. Professor Yanase's mentor, Professor Tatsukichi Minobe, took the same position in this
respect. Minobe, Nikonkoku Kenpi Genron, in YAHIKAKU 449, 454 (1947).
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"independence of administrative authorities from the judiciary" and
"supremacy of the administrative power."
The articles and essays contained in the journal were representative of the
then-prevailing concept ofjudicial power. About that time I graduated from
law school and started my apprenticeship to an academic career. I remember
that while reading these articles and essays I felt much irritation. But I must
confess that I did not know how to overcome it; they looked so confident.
This was the doctrinal situation that confronted the new concept of the
judiciary.
The doctrinal atmosphere surrounding the concept of judicial power in
relation to administrative authorities has changed slowly since then. Now, no
scholar seems to stick to the traditional narrow concept, and judicial power is
interpreted as extending to suits against administrative agencies as well as to
civil and criminal proceedings. Judicial control over administrative discretion
has thus greatly expanded, and such expressions as "independence of
administrative authorities from the judiciary" and "supremacy of the
administrative power (over the judiciary)" are rarely heard.
It appears, however, that elements of the traditional, limited concept of
judicial power remain and control both thejudiciary's way of thinking and way
of operation. One of the most conspicuous indications is the insufficiency of
judicial remedies against administrative authorities. First, the Administrative
Litigation Law strictly limits the opportunity to issue preventive injunctions
against administrative decisions and makes explicitly impermissible
provisional dispositions of any administrative actions. 63 Second, there are no
provisions for declaratory judgments or mandamus. 64 For these reasons, the
prevailing opinion is that judicial courts can neither make declaratory
judgments nor issue writs of mandamus against administrative bodies. These
limitations on judicial remedies provoke various arguments about
administrative law proceedings at large. Needless to say, however, in the case
of constitutional litigation, these limitations are more problematic, since the
infringement of a citizen's fundamental right is involved more frequently than
in other cases.
Let us look, for instance, at a case concerning the constitutionality of the
apportionment of seats for the House of Representatives. In 1976, the
Supreme Court declared for the first time that the seat allocation for the
House of Representatives provided in the Public Officials Election Act
violated the constitutional guarantee of equality under the law. 65 The
Supreme Court first took the opportunity to consider an apportionment
63. Law No. 139, 1962, arts. 25, 44.
64. There is a single example of permissibility in Article 146 of the Local Government Law of
1947. Mandamus proceedings provided for under that law are regarded as strictly exceptional ones,
constituting controlling powers of the central government over local governments.
65. Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Comm'n, 30 MinshfJ 223 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 14,
1976) (interpreting the Public Officials Election Act, Law No. 100, 1950, as amended by Law No.
132, 1964).
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controversy in 1964, in a case concerning the House of Councillors. 66 In this
case, the issue was more delicate than in the later House of Representatives'
case since, in the former, the controversy revolved around the particular issue
of how to consider prefectures as constituency units. The Supreme Court
made a great deal of the Diet's ability to frame constituency units, and,
emphasizing the broad extent of legislative discretion, upheld the
constitutionality of the law under attack. Thus, the Court relied upon the
legislature's wide discretion, not upon the American political question
doctrine. By contrast, in his separate supplemental opinion, Justice Saito
Kitaro argued that the case was nonjusticiable, adopting arguments similar to
those injustice Frankfurter's 1962 dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr.67
No immediate remedy in the plaintiff's favor was expected from the
Court's holding the disputed law unconstitutional. This was not necessarily
due to the Supreme Court, but primarily due to what I would submit is the
defective system of constitutional litigation.
In accordance with Article 204 of the Public Officials Election Act, which
enables any voter to file a suit to invalidate a recent election, the plaintiff
instituted this suit against the Chairman of the Chiba Election Supervision
Commission. There is no doubt that the original intention of Article 204 was
to make it possible for the voters to ask that an election of specific candidates
be nullified for technical reasons. With regard to malapportionment suits, a
specific case is not necessarily concerned with the particular candidate's fate
but rather with the whole system of seat allocation. Moreover, plaintiffs in
malapportionment cases do not always request to invalidate the particular
election already held, but seek to make it impossible to apply the current seat
allocation law to any future elections. For the purpose of malapportionment
disputes, the most appropriate remedies are declaratory judgments,
preventive injunctive relief, or both. However, there is no law that supports
the permissibility of such judicial remedies in Japan.
I believe that, irrespective of the lack of legislative support, the courts may
create a remedy that will prevent the invasion of a citizen's constitutional
right. But the prevailing opinion of administrative law takes the position that
neither declaratory judgments nor preventive injunctions are within the realm
ofjudicial power. It is unlikely that in the near future the courts will invent a
remedy so that plaintiffs may question the validity of a seat allocation law before
an election has actually taken place.
Thus, at present, Article 204 is regarded as the only route available for
plaintiffs in malapportionment litigation. Article 204 litigation is concerned
with the validity of an election already completed. It is almost impossible for
the Supreme Court to nullify a nationwide election as a whole, because the
invalidation of the election may invalidate all of the important political
66. Koshiyama v. Chairman, Tokyo Metropolitan Election Comm'n, 18 MinshO 270 (Sup. Ct.,
G.B., Feb. 5, 1964). For an English translation of the case, see H. ITOH & L. BEER, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN 53-57 (1978).
67. 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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decisions made by the Diet, such as the appointment of the Prime Minister,
legislative or budget matters, and treaty enactments. Therefore, as the
Supreme Court showed in its 1976 holding, it is practically forced to avoid
invalidation of an election, despite its judgment of the unconstitutionality of a
law under attack. The political status quo is almost always strong enough to
nullify whatever action the Court may want to take. Not only because of
Japanese adherence to the narrow concept of the judicial power in relation to
state powers, but also perhaps because of the lack of equitable institutions, no
attempt has been made to renovate the system of remedies for constitutional
litigation. It is now time to do so.
3. A General View of Judicial Review in Operation. During the past forty years,
there have been five occasions on which the Supreme Court denied the
validity of legislation on constitutional grounds. 68 Opinions will vary as to
whether the figure, five, constitutes a good or bad record as an indicator of
the function of our judicial review system. We can surely say, however, that
against the countless number of enactments during the same period, the
figure five is undoubtedly small. Is it the excellent nature of draftsmanship
that prevents the Diet from making bad laws? Or, rather, is it the negativist,
or self-restraining, approach of the Supreme Court that makes the Court apt
to respect legislative determinations? It would not be unfair to say that most
scholars and lawyers share the opinion that negativism in judicial review is
one of the most characteristic features of the Japanese Supreme Court.
Throughout the forty-year history of the Constitution, the expression "wide
legislative discretion" has been employed by the courts in one way or another.
Even in the field of freedom of expression, the Supreme Court is willing to
speak about "legislative discretion." 69
68. Article 200 of the Penal Code, which imposes heavier penalties for committing patricide
than for regular homicide, was held unconstitutional as violating the equal protection clause, Article
14, clause 1, of the Constitution. Aizawa v. Japan, 27 Keisht 265 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 7, 1973)
(affirming I Keisai Gepp6 544 (Utsunnomiya Dist. Ct., May 19, 1969) and reversing 619 HanreiJih6
93 (Tokyo H. Ct., May 12, 1970)). A law regulating the location of drugstores was held
unconstitutional as against the constitutional protection of free enterprise, Article 22 of the
Constitution. Umehara v. Japan (The Pharmacy Case), 29 Minshf5 572 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 30,
1975). In Kurokawa, the Court found the law to be unconstitutional on the basis of the equal
protection clause but did not invalidate the challenged law. 30 Minshai 223. See also Kamao v.
Hiroshima Election Comm'n, 39 Minshi I 100 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,July 17, 1985). The Forest Law, which
restrained a certain type of claim for the division of common ownership of forestry, was held
unconstitutional because it violated the guarantee of property rights, Article 29, clause 1. Hiraguchi
v. Hiraguchi, 41 Minsh5 408 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 22, 1987).
69. The Public Officials Election Act absolutely prohibits door-to-door election canvassing.
Since 1950 the Supreme Court has continuously held that such regulation is constitutional. 4 Keishu
1799 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Sept. 27, 1950); 21 Keishfi 1245 (Sup. Ct., 3d P.B., Nov. 21, 1967) (translated
into English in H. ITOH & L. BEER, supra note 66, at 149-51. See generally L. BEER, FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION IN JAPAN 376-77 (1984). In the beginning, the Supreme Court relied on the broad
"public welfare" standard. Now, however, the Court prefers to give weight to the wide discretionary
powers of the legislature. Typical examples are seen injustice Itoh's opinions: 38 Keish6 387 (Sup.
Ct., 3d P.B., Feb. 21, 1984); 35 Keishil 568 (Sup. Ct., 3d P.B., July 21, 1981). The prevailing
understanding in Japan, that the state has a free hand to regulate election canvassing, greatly
contrasts with the American perception that free canvassing should be guaranteed to the greatest
degree possible, especially for election purposes. I am of the opinion that the state should not have
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Perhaps it should be noted here that the Supreme Court has never held
unconstitutional any regulation on freedom of expression. The Court once
suggested that freedom of expression deserves more protection than freedom
of economic activities and that, therefore, court examinations should be more
strict in the field of free expression. 70 In practice, however, the Court has
never strictly scrutinized regulations on free expression. Considering that the
Court has twice declared economic regulations unconstitutional, it appears
that the Court treats freedom of economic activities more seriously than
freedom of expression.
It seems that there is a general tendency for the Supreme Court to avoid
constitutional judgments as much as possible. In contrast, the United States
Supreme Court has observed Justice Brandeis' admonition calling for judicial
self-restraint, but has found laws unconstitutional when necessary. 7'
As discussed previously, in 1971 the Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the lower court concerning an application for a taxi driver's license, saying
that the administrative agency had denied the application for the license
without first providing the applicant with proper notice and an opportunity
for hearings. 72 For the first time, the Supreme Court was speaking about a
citizen's right to procedural due process in an administrative proceeding.
While the Tokyo High Court as well as the Tokyo District Court based a
citizen's right on Articles 13 and/or 31 of the Constitution itself, the Supreme
Court did not rely upon any constitutional provisions. The Court established
the right as if it existed as a necessary result of the interpretation of the Road
Transportation Law. 7 3
To the Court, this was not constitutional litigation but a regular case of
administrative law. However, it should be noted that the reason the agency
denied the application without complying with the procedural requirements
was that there was no explicit provision in the law conferring upon an
applicant the right to notice and the opportunity for a hearing. Therefore, it
is fair to say that the Court invented a new interpretation of the law so that,
for the first time, applicants were able to enjoy procedural safeguards with
respect to administrative agencies. It is almost certain that in so doing the
Supreme Court was guided by the liberal, democratic spirit of the
Constitution. Without relying on the Constitution, it would have been
impossible for the Court to have invented such a right.
Why, then, did the Court not mention anything of a constitutional nature?
The reason seems rather simple: If the Court had relied upon constitutional
law, the coverage of a citizen's right to notice and opportunity for a hearing
would extend to various administrative processes other than the one
wide discretionary powers to regulate election campaigns. See, for example, Y. OKUDAIRA, NAZE
HYOGENNOJIYUKA 153-220 (1988), in which I analyze Japanese case law and make some comparative
observations by referring to American cases.
70. 26 Keishfi 586.
71. See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
72. 25 Minshbi 1037.
73. Law No. 183, 1951, arts. 6, 122.
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concerned in the instant case. On the other hand, if confined by the narrow
framework of statutory interpretation, the recognized right is only applicable
to cases within the same framework. By failing to acknowledge constitutional
questions, the Japanese Supreme Court seems to want to decide
constitutional issues on a case-by-case basis.
Another example indicating the same tendency to operate on a case-by-
case basis is contained in one of the Court's most recent decisions. The case
concerned the lawfulness of a judge's order prohibiting those in attendance
from taking notes during courtroom proceedings. Theoretically, this kind of
restraint order is made on the basis of the discretionary, disciplinary powers
of the individual judge presiding over the court; in practice, however, almost
all trial courts have adopted a similar rule of general prohibition. A few years
ago, an American lawyer filed a suit against this type of prohibition. The
Tokyo District Court dismissed the action and held that the prohibition order
was within the discretionary powers of the presiding judge, and that there was
nothing unlawful about such an order.74 This holding was affirmed by the
Tokyo High Court. 75  The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court in
substance and declared that, in spite of a judge's wide disciplinary powers, the
presiding judge was not allowed to prohibit those in attendance from taking
notes, irrespective of the type of case. 76
It seems that the issue presented was related to a citizen's right to attend,
inspect, and record court proceedings, and as such it was very much similar to
the issue that the United States Supreme Court confronted in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia7 7 and similar cases. In those cases, the United
States Supreme Court dealt, without the slightest hesitation, with the issue at
the constitutional level as a problem regarding first amendment rights. In
contrast, however, the Japanese Supreme Court solved the case simply on the
basis of the scope of a judge's discretionary and disciplinary powers.
Evidently our Court would not like to make any affirmative statements about
the people's right to know, because, once open to that direction,
constitutional claims would extend from the right to take notes in the
courtroom to the right to inspect various government institutions, as well as
to the right to have access to government records. 78
One additional example is helpful. The top leader of one of Japan's
largest and most influential religious organizations charged a magazine
publisher with the crime of defamation and claimed that his reputation had
74. Repeta v.Japan, 1222 HanreiJih6 28 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Feb. 12, 1987). The case is known as
the "Repeta" case following the name of the American plaintiff.
75. 1262 HanreiJih6 30 (Tokyo H. Ct., Dec. 25, 1987).
76. 43 Minshfi 89 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Mar. 8, 1989).
77. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). See also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S.
501 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
78. In Japan, there is no "open government" legislation such as the American Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988), the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 1
(1988), and the Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. & 39 U.S.C.).
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seriously been harmed by the defendant's publication. The publisher was
indicted. 79 The issue presented was precisely the freedom of expression
versus a person's right to enjoy his reputation. The questions asked were
whether the publisher's constitutional right was more important than the
leader's personal claim and, if so, why and to what extent? Borrowing the
American terminology, the Court was dealing with the concept of a "public
figure." Needless to say, in the United States, that concept belongs within the
area of constitutional law. The first amendment is the starting point: The
concept of "public figure" has been created and clarified by the courts in
order to uphold the first amendment and to accommodate other interests
such as personal reputation or privacy.
The same must apply to Japanese jurisprudence when dealing with the
concept of "public figure." In contrast, however, in the defamation case of
the religious leader mentioned above, the Supreme Court spoke little about
constitutional law or the guarantee of freedom of the press. The Court solved
the case almost exclusively within the framework of statutory interpretation.
The resolution of the case was correct-I have no serious objection with it.
What is annoying is the way the Court resolved the issue.
The Court introduced a kind of "public figure" concept by setting three
requirements to establish defamation.8 0 The Court did this by merely
interpreting the defamation law. A young American lawyer, a postgraduate
student who was studying in Japan, remarked "I have recently examined the
Supreme Court decision carefully. But one thing puzzles me very much. The
Court does not say much about the Constitution. It talks only about statutory
construction. Is statutory law predominant over the Constitution in Japan?"
It is not clear why the Supreme Court preferred to rely on statutory
79. Prosecution of defamation is instituted only upon a charge from the injured person. PENAL
CODE art. 232, Law No. 45, 1907. The substantive law of criminal defamation appears both in
Articles 230 and 230(2) of the Code. Article 230 provides:
1. A person who defames another by publicly alleging facts shall, regardless of whether
such facts are true or false, be punished with imprisonment at or without forced labor for
not more than three years or a fine of not more than 1,000 yen.
2. A person who defames a dead person shall not be punished unless such defamation is
based on a falsehood.
Article 230(2), which was inserted into the Penal Code in 1947, Law No. 124, 1947, originated from
Article 45 of the Newspaper Law, Law No. 41, 1909. Right after the war in 1945, the Newspaper Law
wa- first suspended and then finally abolished. Law No. 95, 1949. Article 45 of the Newspaper Law
was, as it were, transplanted, with minor modification, into the Criminal Code. It says:
1. When the act provided for in paragraph 1 of the preceding article is found to relate to
matters of public interest and to have been done solely for the benefit of the public and,
upon inquiry into the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, the truth is proved, punishment
shall not be imposed.
2. In the application of the provision of the preceding paragraph, matters concerning the
criminal act of a person for which prosecution has not yet been instituted shall be
deemed to be matters of public interest.
3. When the act provided for in paragraph 1 of the preceding article is done with respect to
matters concerning a public servant or a candidate for elective public office and, upon
inquiry into the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, the truth is proved, punishment shall
not be imposed.
Law No. 41, 1909 (repealed, Law No. 95, 1949).
80. See PENAL CODE art. 230(2); discussion supra note 79.
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construction rather than on Article 21 of the Constitution. However, one
thing is certain: If you are successful in establishing such a doctrine on
constitutional grounds rather than on a mere statutory basis, the position of
the doctrine will be stronger because it would be invulnerable to any change
in the law concerned.
4. Origins ofJudicial Negativism. It is difficult to explain judicial negativism in
Japan in a systematic way. However, we might make a tentative observation.
The Supreme Court functions as the highest court not only of constitutional
law, but of all types of law. Such characteristics of the Court as a "regular
court" can be found in the United States model.8' However, since the United
States has a federal system, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as a federal
institution is limited. Within such jurisdiction, the category of constitutional
litigation is likely to be distinguished from other "regular" litigation. On the
contrary, Japan has a unitary system and therefore the Supreme Court
handles diverse cases including even legal conflicts relating to the bylaws of
local government. Justices are expected to manage legal technicalities and to
develop neat interpretations of law. Such justices are assisted by Supreme
Court Investigation Officers who are career judges, well versed in the
technicalities and the arts of interpretation. Thus, most justices are inclined
to follow the thinking pattern of career judges, or at least those justices with
backgrounds as career judges are likely to hold the leadership among the
justices. It is natural for them to become more apolitical or conservative.
Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the Cabinet 82 and, except for
the immediate postwar period, Japan has been ruled by a single, conservative
party, the LDP. This means that the power to appoint Supreme Court justices
has been monopolized by this conservative political party. It is, in a sense,
natural for the Cabinet to appoint pro-LDP legal experts who have
conservative attitudes. The Cabinet, as a rule, considers candidates from
among career judges, prosecutors, practicing lawyers, and law school
professors, on the basis of the recommendations of some sections of the legal
community. With few exceptions, only men beyond the age of sixty-two or
sixty-three have been selected, and no woman has ever been suggested as a
candidate. The retirement age of justices is seventy years.8 3 In the fall of
1989, two justices retired from the bench and two new justices replaced them.
During 1990, six more justices will retire. Thus, in less than one and a half
years, more than one-half (eight out of fifteen) of the justices will be
replaced-a drastic change in personnel. However, given the realities of how
81. So far as the characteristic of the Supreme Court as a "regular court" is concerned, I submit
that our Court resembles the High Court of the Commonwealth of Australia. See Okudaira, The
Australian and Japanese Constitutions, inJAPAN AND AUSTRALIA 169, 181-82 (P. Drysdale & H. Kitaoji eds.
1981).
82. 1947 CONST. art. 79. As to the ChiefJustice, Article 6, clause 2 provides that "[t]he Emperor
shall appoint the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court as designated by the Cabinet." The tenno s
appointment of the Chief Justice is just nominal. The Cabinet designation is everything in this
matter.
83. The Judiciary Law, Law No. 59, 1947, art. 50.
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justices are appointed, it is rather difficult to expect such a group of people to
challenge the status quo.
The foregoing discussion does not necessarily mean to suggest that the
party in power selects justices simply on the basis of political beliefs. As a
matter of fact, the LDP or the Cabinet has employed a sort of quota system by
which a fixed number of justices' seats are allocated to a few different circles
of the legal profession. Five or six seats are for candidates from the circle of
careerjudges. The career judges chosen are most likely those who have been
either a chief judge or otherwise a senior judge of a high court. The most
certain way to be promoted to justice on the Supreme Court is to have first
occupied the position of secretary general of the Supreme Court.8 4 From the
circle of public prosecutors, three or four persons are selected from among
those who work for the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office or serve as the
head of a High Public Prosecutor's Office. Interestingly, one seat has
customarily been reserved for a career diplomat.
Although this description of the selection process for justices is
incomplete, it is enough to understand that the Court consists of people who
serve as a sort of representative from each circle of the profession and that, as
such, the Court constitutes an institution of stratification. It is no wonder
then that in this highly bureaucratic machinery, formalism controls, and
rospect for the status quo is of primary importance.
It is an undeniable fact that the type of judicial review developed by the
United States Supreme Court is unique. The Court, which against the
background of the rule of law or the British tradition of judicial supremacy
had established itself as a firm institution, came to gain new powers and
prestige in extending judicial protection against the curtailment of civil
liberties during and after World War I and in fostering the new system of
federalism to develop welfare policies since the New Deal era. In Japan, on
the other hand, there has been no tradition of judicial supremacy and no
history of Supreme Court achievements. In spite of such a clear clause as
Article 81 of the Japanese Constitution, it might be unwarranted to expect
Japan's Supreme Court to be as powerful and prestigious as its American
counterpart.
In any event, anyone must admit that the prestige of the Japanese
Supreme Court is not as high as that of its United States counterpart. The
Court has never played the unique role in the country's political and social life
that the United States Supreme Court has played. The Court has never been
the subject of bitter criticism or high praise from the outside world, and it
seems the justices are quite satisfied with their situation. Perhaps our Court
knows it has neither enough authority nor enough prestige to hand down
84. See, e.g., Danelski, The Political Impact of the Japanese Supreme Court, 49 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955,
979 (1974). Three consecutive chiefjustices-Terada Jiro (1982-85), Yaguchi Koichi (1985-90) and
Kasaba Ryohachi (1990- )-share the same experience of having served as Secretary General of the
Supreme Court before their appointments as justices.
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decisions such as INS v. Chadha8 5 or Texas v. Johnson,86 which strike hard blows
either at the Congress or at the administration, or at both. Because the Court
does not venture to challenge another branch of the government, its authority
is not augmented and its prestige does not increase. It looks as if it is caught
in a vicious circle.
V
EXTRAJUDICIAL FACTORS SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN JAPAN
I am inclined to undervalue the role our Supreme Court has actually played
in creating a new constitutional order and in protecting citizens'
constitutional rights. Do all the rights and liberties happily enumerated in the
Constitution remain unprotected? Should we still consider Japanese society
to be as unliberal and undemocratic as it was before the war? The answer to
these questions is no.
Generally, the degree of protection of civil liberties and other fundamental
human rights in Japan is not insignificant compared to that of Western
countries. In particular, political freedom is greatly safeguarded and
subjected to almost no direct restraint by the government. There is no legal
impediment to criticism of the government, politicians, and bureaucrats.
Japan is not free from problems in this field of law. On the contrary, in our
own way we are confronted with plenty of problems. However, I believe that
every country, each with its own unique social circumstances, also has its own
weaknesses in the area of protecting civil liberties and citizens' rights. Japan is
no exception.
In short, it is not unfair to say that the Japanese people enjoy a good level
of civil liberties and civil rights. Why did that become possible in such a
constitutionally underdeveloped society in which the courts-the formal
institutions-are not very enthusiastic about protecting citizens' liberties and
rights? The first condition I would like to point out as advantageous to the
establishment of people's rights and liberties is the economic factor. During
these forty years or so, Japan has witnessed the successful development of its
economy, which in turn has contributed to a rather smooth process of making
the society stable and modern. Economic growth in Japan has never been in
conflict with the development of individual rights, but, rather, by fostering the
development of independent citizens and the modernization of labor-
management relations, the protection of these rights has contributed to
economic growth.8 7
One of the most important factors encouraging Japanese economic growth
and the protection of citizens' rights is the favorable effect of the international
85. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
86. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
87. Akio Morita, Chairman of Sony Corporation, emphasizes the impact of the constitutional
guarantees of citizens' rights not only on the development of his own company, but also on the
economic growth of Japan. A. MORITA, MADE IN JAPAN 151-56, 171-72, 201 (1986) (Japanese
language version).
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circumstances which surround Japan. Unlike many other countries in Asia's
recent history, Japan has not been involved in international conflicts. IfJapan
were a divided nation like South and North Korea, its citizens would have felt
the tension caused by the division; as a result, the curtailment of civil liberties
would have been regarded as inevitable. The fact thatJapan is a lucky country
in terms of its current international circumstances constitutes, I submit, the
second element that is advantageous to the protection of citizens' rights.
Third, I would like to point out the particular effect of the legal reforms
carried out during the Occupation. Prewar Japan was notorious for
governmental restraints on civil liberties. There were a great number of
suppressive laws conferring wide powers on the police. The Occupation
powers urged the Japanese Government to eradicate those laws at their roots.
With some minor exceptions, the clearance of those "bad laws" was
accomplished.8 8 Japan started its postwar modernization from scratch, free
from various suppressive laws. It is difficult to resurrect anything once it is
abolished. This particularly applies in the case of the repealed "bad laws."
Since Japan became independent in 1952, some conservative, nationalist-
minded politicians have tried to reintroduce several suppressive laws of the
prewar type, but almost always in vain. 89 With all the powers that the LDP
possesses, it is not inclined to introduce and carry forth confrontational bills
that are likely to provoke controversies among the people. Bills imposing
limitations on civil liberties are certainly confrontational ones. This means
88. We cannot, however, neglect the fact that SCAP requested the Japanese Government to
make special enactments for the interest of the Occupation powers, some of which were as
suppressive as the police laws of prewar Japan. See, e.g., Imperial Order No. 311, 1946; Cabinet
Order No. 201, 1948; Cabinet Order No. 64, 1949. SCAP's Directive in June 1950 to prohibit the
publication of Akahata, the Communist Party's organ, and Cabinet Order 325, 1950, were also
examples of this kind of legislation. It was almost an established doctrine that these orders issued by
SCAP's directives were beyond the effect of the Constitution because SCAP itself was
superconstitutional. There was no court decision during the Occupation in which the validity of
legislation of this type was examined.
89. Perhaps the Subversive Activities Control Law, Law No. 240, 1952, was an exception. See
supra note 30. Overcoming strong opposition movements, this law was enacted pursuant to a special
Cabinet Ordinance made under SCAP's directive. The Subversive Activities Control Law confers
upon the Director of the Public Safety Investigation Bureau the power to request, after the Bureau's
investigations, the Review Commission of Public Safety to regulate certain activities of any
organizations that are deemed to be engaged in overthrowing the Government by violence. The
sanctions imposed upon such organizations by the Review Commission are varied, yet all are strict-
similar to the sanctions of the United States counterpart, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781 et seq. However, since its
enactment in 1952, there has been no case in Japan in which the Director of the Investigation Bureau
requested the Review Commission to regulate any organizations, including the Communist party and
its affiliated groups. We have several criminal cases where there was an attempt to apply Article 38 of
the law, an anti-incitement clause, to radical speakers or bill distributors. But these were not
concerned with regulation of organization. If the actual legislative purpose of the Subversive
Activities Control Law is control on organizations' subversive activities, there has been no attempt in
Japan to invoke that law as originally intended. Except for a short period during the Occupation, the
Communist Party has never been troubled by governmental restraints, and has continuously had a
meaningful number of its representatives elected to the Diet. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, anti-
Communist sentiment was somewhat provoked when Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida suggested the
introduction in either the Cabinet or in the Diet of an Un-Japanese Activities Committee modelled
after the Un-American Activities Committee. In Japan, however, "McCarthyism" never became as
strong as it was in the United States.
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that the LDP realizes that the people have become sensitive to restraints on
civil liberties-sensitive enough to react strongly against any attempt at such
legislation. This sensitivity of the people, or the people's consciousness
regarding fundamental human rights, is really one of the characteristics that
distinguishes our contemporaries from the people of prewar Japan. This
sensitivity is the fourth factor that is advantageous to the protection of
citizens' rights.
For better or worse, the Japanese are so fond of the term "human rights"
that foreigners are amazed at how frequently the Japanese use this term. The
term, of course, originates from the fundamental human rights mentioned in
the Constitution. Whether conscious of the constitutional connotation, the
Japanese are apt to use the term human rights even at times when such words
as "right," "claim," or "entitlement" would be more appropriate for the
particular context. They say, for example, "human rights of women,"
"human rights of children," "foreigners' human rights," and even "human
rights of taxpayers." The term seems to imply an emotional attraction to
which the Japanese are susceptible.
Illustrative of this devotion to human rights are the disputes over the
Foreigners' Registration Law, which requires every foreigner over the age of
sixteen who is staying in the country for more than one year to have his or her
fingerprints taken.90 Until recently, there had been a provision in that law
which required that the fingerprints be taken again every five years
thereafter. 9' According to the original law of 1952, foreigners over the age of
fourteen, rather than sixteen, were requested to have their fingerprints taken,
and they had to repeat this procedure every two years rather than every five
years. The history of the amendment of this law is a bit complicated and is
traceable to the change of immigration policies at large as well as policies
regarding Korean and Chinese permanent residents in Japan. I believe that
the law was copied after the United States Foreigners' Registration Act, which
was a product of a national emergency. 92 While the fingerprint requirement
is not used in the United States any longer, Japanese immigration authorities
are too serious about their duties to stop enforcing the law. Moreover, there
are a great number of Korean residents in Japan whose nationality is either of
the Republic of Korea or of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and
as such are treated as foreigners. 93
Most Korean residents adopt a Japanese way of life, particularly after two
or three generations. However, all of them must appear before the
immigration authorities every five years and have their fingerprints retaken. A
few years ago, some of them refused to have their fingerprints taken. A
number of others, including a few other foreigners from Western countries,
90. Foreigner's Registration Law, Law No. 125, 1952, art. 14.
91. Id. art. 11 (as amended by Law No. 75, 1982).
92. Pub. L. No. 670, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1201(b) (1940).
93. The following description in terms of Korean residents applies to Taiwanese residents-
mutatis mutandis.
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followed suit and refused to obey the law. Some of them were prosecuted.
Wide protest movements in the name of human rights followed not only
among Korean residents and other foreigners, but also among Japanese
citizens.
The legal position of these protesters was that the fingerprint requirement
violated their right to privacy 94 or, alternatively, that it discriminated against
foreigners, particularly against Korean residents. 9 5 It was a bit dubious
whether either of these constitutional arguments could be successfully
maintained, and even more dubious whether the judicial courts would be
persuaded by these arguments. While there were a few court decisions,
including one of the Tokyo High Court, none showed any sympathy toward a
constitutional presentation of the issue.9 6 To the people concerned, however,
it did not matter whether their arguments were well constructed on a
constitutional basis. To them, their perception that the law was against
human rights was enough and should be accepted by all. The fingerprint
issue became extremely controversial. 9 7
In September 1987, the Diet amended the law and deleted the
requirement that fingerprints be retaken every five years.98 This was, from
the Government's viewpoint, a solution to the human rights controversy. A
second aspect in solving this controversy, from the Government's standpoint,
took place at the time of Emperor Hirohito's funeral. In February 1989, the
Cabinet announced a General Amnesty Order by which all prosecutions
against persons refusing to obey the fingerprint law were dropped.9 9
I do not intend to say that this example illustrates a typical case of the
Japanese way of solving problems. It does, however, indicate something of
the working of human rights ideology in contemporary Japan. 0 0
94. Today, it is generally understood that Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees the right to
privacy, whatever that right may be.
95. The legal status of Korean residents in Japan is a complex issue. For our purposes, however,
suffice it to say that before the war their nationality was Japanese.
96. E.g., 1287 Hanrei Jih6 158 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Jan. 29, 1988); 1285 Hanrei Jih6 152
(Yokohama Dist. Ct., Kawasaki Br., Nov. 18, 1987); 1179 HanreiJiho 156 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct., Ogura
Br., Aug. 23, 1985); 1125 Hanrei Jih6 96 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug. 29, 1984); 1125 Hanrei Jih6 96
(Yokohama Dist. Ct.,June 14, 1984), aff'd 1208 Hanrei Jiho 66 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug. 25, 1986).
97. In the meantime, the issue became a matter of discussion between the Japanese Government
and the Government of the Republic of Korea.
98. Law No. 107, 1987.
99. Cabinet Order No. 27, 1989. To the protesters, Hirohito was a symbol of all racial
discrimination, especially in terms of discrimination against Koreans. So, the amnesty in memory of
Hirohito was hypocritical and as such was hardly acceptable. Some of the accused attempted to
continue arguing their cases in court. The Tokyo High Court was confronted with one such case.
The Yokohama District Court had dismissed the indictment of a Korean who refused fingerprinting
on the basis of the aforementioned Amnesty Order, but the defendant appealed the case, seeking a
declaration that he was not guilty. The Tokyo High Court, however, dismissed the appeal for the
same reason as the District Court, without considering the merits of the case. 1320 HanreiJiho 165
(Tokyo H. Ct., July 6, 1989). The way the case was handled reminds the author of the "Placard"
decision in 2 Keish6 529.
100. In the context of the public sentiment originating from the Constitution, it is appropriate to
touch on the idea of "pacifism," which, of course, originates from, or is symbolized in, Article 9,
which renounces war. It has long been said that Article 9 became devoid of substance after it could
not prevent the Government from establishing the Self-Defense Forces. This, however, is an
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In connection with the public sentiment, some mention should be made of
the working of the mass media. Generally, the media world is very much in
favor of protecting citizens' rights and covering constitutional issues
extensively. Most of the media, including the otherwise conservative sections,
are usually critical of the Supreme Court's decisions. It might be said that the
mass media tend, if not intentionally, to serve as a counterbalance to the
negativist approach of the Supreme Court. While some Supreme Court
justices are usually extremely reluctant to declare laws unconstitutional, some
of them are willing to express an advisory comment in their concurring
opinions suggesting that the legislation in dispute be revised. 101 Interestingly,
the mass media are often inclined to highlight such advisory comments.
Neither the press nor the general public is ready to distinguish between the
authoritative opinion of the Court and the more extrajudicial comments of
individual justices. As a result, the citizenry is left with an impression that the
Court is doing something to protect citizens' rights.
Finally, but not exhaustively, I would like to give some attention to the
legislative process in Japan. Because of the long tradition of the supraparty
Cabinet, almost all meaningful legislation is made under Cabinet
responsibility. Of course, legislation by House members, especially by LDP
members, takes place on occasion, but it is quite limited. Further, its quality
and significance is usually not that of Cabinet legislation. Cabinet legislation
is basically made as follows: Drafts are prepared by government ministries
and agencies, and before submission to the majority party committee for
review, the drafts undergo a strict examination by the Cabinet Bureau of
Legislation, a unique group of highly competent experts on legal
technicalities who scrutinize the compatibility of draft bills with the existing
legal system and make recommendations for modifications necessary to avoid
having the new laws later judged unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
This system of screening by the Cabinet Bureau of Legislation is not provided
for in the Constitution.
Such recent confrontational bills as the bill demanding governmental
support of Yasukuni (Shinto) Shrine 0 2 or the bill protecting military
secrets 03 were presented to the Diet by a conservative group of the LDP. It is
unclear whether the majority asked the Cabinet to take responsibility for
oversimplification. Article 9 still functions in various, but not strictly legal, ways. For instance, it
continuously fosters a pacifist ideology among the people, and it serves to hinder or to minimize the
enactment of special laws for the military powers. An example of this ideology is the fact that we
have had no special legislation protecting military secrets. In a way, Article 9, together with the
pacifist public sentiment, has contributed to protect civil liberties in Japanese society.
101. See, e.g., the concurring opinions in Oshima v. Hamiguchi, 39 Minsha 247 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,
Mar. 27, 1985) (a case on the constitutionality of the Income Tax Law); 38 Minshti 1308.
102. The bill was proposed by some LDP members for the first time to the 61st Diet in June 1969.
Since then, they have presented similar bills five times. The Diet has not, however, substantively
discussed any of the bills.
103. The bill, commonly called the Spy Protection Bill, was introduced to the 102nd Diet in June
1985. But the Diet session terminated at the end of the year without carrying the bill over to the next
session. As a result, the bill was dropped with no chance for parliamentary debate. Since then, there
has been no indication of anyone reintroducing a similar bill.
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making any of this legislation. In any event, it seems very unlikely that any
government ministry or agency, or the Cabinet Bureau of Legislation, would
be willing to take the initiative in preparing such a bill.
In fulfilling their mandate to assure that new bills do not contradict the
existing order of constitutional law, bureaucrats are, if only incidentally,
taking part in the protection of citizens' rights.
VI
CONCLUSION
Japan was the first country in Asia to have a written constitution in late
nineteenth century. The Constitution was given to the people from above in
the name of the tennj. The aim of making the Constitution was to moderate
his state. The modernization was imperative in order to persuade the Western
countries to revise the unfair and discriminatory treaties that had been
negotiated between these Western countries and Japan in the Tokugawa
Shogunate in the 1850s and 1860s.
Legal positivism prevailed in the Western world in that period, and
aspirations for constitutionalism once prevalent during the revolutionary era
at the end of the eighteenth century had already been swept away by that time.
The Meiji Constitution was completed in such an ideological atmosphere. It
is not surprising that leaders of the Western countries seemed rather tolerant
of Schein-Konstitutionalismus, or pseudo-constitutionalism, which was easily
identifiable in the Meiji Constitution.
However "pseudo" it might be, Japan could not avoid introducing a
certain degree, or some appearance, of authentic constitutionalism in one way
or other. Thus, two conflicting views were embedded in the Constitution:
one for demanding a strong, authoritarian state based on a sort of divine
theory of the tenni regime, and the other calling for real modernization of the
society on the basis of something akin to world universalism.
Various reflections of these two views appeared and disappeared one after
another during its fifty-five year history. One thing is clear, however: Under
the Meiji Constitution, true, unreserved democracy could not be attained. As
a matter of fact, the very word "democracy" was not permissible because it
sounded repugnant to the tennj's sovereignty. Democracy as well as the
meaningful safeguard of civil liberties remained to be achieved in the
unforeseeable future when Japan would have an utterly new Constitution.
The new Constitution was promulgated and enacted in 1946-1947 as a
result of Japan's defeat in World War II. By having the present Constitution,
Japan again became the first country in Asia to have a constitution of almost
unreserved democracy.' 0 4 Japan declared that it was founded upon a
"principle of mankind."10 5
104. The degree of "unreservedness" is dependent upon one's evaluation of the interposition of
the tennd system.
105. 1947 CONST. preamble, 1.
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Japan's process of democratization is still going on. There remains a lot of
unfinished business. One indication of its incompleteness is that there has
been no turnover of the reins of government since 1955 when a newly set-up
conservative party, the LDP, ascended to power. Whatever may be the
reasons for one party's continuation in power for thirty-five years, such a
phenomenon of power monopoly should be regarded as anomalous to
democracy. This anomaly is, however, due to matters of politics and to the
political judgments of the people; nobody can claim it results from defects in
the Constitution. On the contrary, the Constitution opens every possibility
for the turnover of administrations. The current anomaly may therefore be
expected to be overcome in the future.
With the present Constitution, Japan adopted for the first time in her
history a constitution of judicial enforceability. The new experience in this
respect is especially important to safeguarding the bill of rights. The idea of
legally protected "fundamental human rights" has greatly affected the
Japanese way of thinking. But, partly because of the traditional, narrow
concept of judicial power, and partly because of bureaucratization of the
Supreme Court (as well as many other factors), the development of judicial
review of constitutionality is very slow and limited-at least in the eyes of
American lawyers. Once, twenty-five years ago, the late Professor Nathanson
described the then-prevalent trend of judicial review in Japan like this: "It is
obvious that the Supreme Court has not been in the forefront of the fight for
the realization of civil liberties injapan. While it has generally paid lip service
to the principles of Chapter III (Rights and Duties of the People) of the
Constitution, it has not struck any resounding blows for their effective
implementation."' 10 6 His observation was absolutely right, not only in the
context of what had happened by the middle of the 1960s, but also in the
context of the situation from then on.
This does not necessarily mean that our Supreme Court has lost its raison
d'etre and proved itself meaningless. Although it is undeniable that our
system of judicial review does not function in the way that its counterpart in
the United States does, it is certain that this system, together with the very
declaration of the bill of rights, is taken seriously and as such affects in some
manner-obviously in an extralegal way-the social and political life of the
people.
At the moment, I cannot systematically describe and clearly evaluate what
constitutes the characteristics of the function (instead of the text) of the
Japanese Constitution and whether these characteristics, if any, bode well or
ill for the future ofJapan. Nevertheless, I am somehow rather more optimistic
than pessimistic about the healthy development of modern constitutionalism
in Japan-on the condition that she will not confront an unexpected,
extraordinary crisis, either political or economic, in or out of the country's
domain.
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